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Edited by Grant
H. Morris.Springfield: Charles C. Thomas, 1970. Pp. 136.
The impact of Rouse v. Cameron' has indeed underscored the
observation of its author, Judge Bazelon, that "[a]ny court decision
which even smacks of novelty can be counted upon to spawn a rash of
commentary." 2 Considerable, continuing reaction in forum and in
print has ensued in the relatively short lifetime of this decision.
Unfortunately, any decision which touches several areas-law,
medicine, politics, and sociology-and is capable of provoking strong
affective responses in each, also runs the risk of poorly defined,
uncoordinated, and perhaps unproductive examination. When a
psychiatrist reacts to the "right to treatment," for instance, it is not
always clear whether the treatment standard to which he refers is that
of the actual holding in Rouse, the weaker standard suggested in
Tribby v. Cameron3 and Dobson v. Cameron,4 or the dream
envisioned by Judge Bazelon that mental health, the most basic of
life's necessities, is owed to every man.5 On the other hand, legal
scholars may differ considerably in their operational concepts of the
term "mentally ill."
A thorough and meaningful study of a potentially far-reaching
decision such as Rouse should include coordinated, interdisciplinary
efforts by individuals who address their attention to identical,
definitive issues. One early effort in this direction yielded a collection
of papers published in 1969.6 More recently, a symposium organized
by Grant Morris has led to publication of The Mentally Ill and the
Right to Treatment. In this rather concise book, most of the relevant
issues first dramatically raised by Rouse are at least touched. Other
issues of less obvious relevance and perhaps less deserving emphasis
are also included, but do not seriously detract from the book.
Working on the premise that involuntarily institutionalized
individuals, while constituting large numbers, are among the most
THE MENTALLY ILL AND THE RIGHT TO TREATMENT.

1. 373 F.2d451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
2. Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, in THE MENTALLY ILL AND THE RIGHT
TO TREATmNT 95 (G. Morris ed. 1970) [this book hereinafter cited as MORRIS].
3. 379 F.2d 104 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
4. 383 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
5. Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment,in MORRIS 108.
6. Symposium-The Right to Treatment, 57 GEo. L.J. 673 (1969).
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disadvantaged legally, medically, and socially in our country, the
editor assigns to the book as its primary focus a concern with the legal
right recognized in Rouse-the right of mentally ill patients in public
mental institutions to receive adequate treatment for mental
conditions. Problems identified at the outset and directed to the
various authors include: what constitutes adequate treatment of an
institutionalized mental patient; what procedures can and should be
devised to insure that a patient receives adequate treatment; what legal
remedies should be available to the patient who is not receiving
adequate treatment; and how should the patient's access to these legal
7
remedies be safeguarded?
The book is composed of six essays, each written by a different
author. The authors, who all have background interests in mental
health and law, include the editor of the book, Grant Morris, and
Mrs. Patricia Marschall, both lawyers; the author of the Rouse
opinion, Judge Bazelon; a sociologist, August Hollingshead; and two
psychiatrists, Jay Katz and Harold Visotsky. Four essays-chapters
1, 2, 3, and 5-appear to have special relevance to the title of the
book, and any one of them might have provided a suitable
introduction to the published symposium. The two additional
essays-chapters 4 and 6-while interesting and fairly well-written,
are less directly related to the title. Each essay merits some individual
consideration.
In exploring the ramifications of "right to treatment" as a legal
concept, Katz" reflects a knowledge of principles and problems central
in existing psychiatric practice in the light of important legal
considerations. For instance, he suggests that motivation, the role of
the unconscious, and the contrast between psychiatric treatment
models which require the collaboration of the patient and those which
do not, have important implications where possible waiver of the right
to treatment, a refusal of treatment, and the relationship of rights and
duties are concerned. The author questions whether the right to
treatment in Rouse conflicts with certain fundamental, although often
disregarded, assumptions of law and psychiatry and proceeds to
examine how a duty to be treated and to treat may distort certain
objectives of the right to treatment doctrine. These objectives include
safeguarding the legal process, protecting the individual's need for
7. MORRIS ix.
8. Katz, The Right to Treatment-An EnchantingLegal Fiction,in MORRIS 3.

Vol. 1971:653]

BOOK REVIEW

adequate treatment, preventing community neglect, and encouraging
the mental health profession to promulgate standards of care.
In the remainder of his essay, Katz examines various aspects of
treatment coercion. For the most part he invites the community and
the law to play a significantly greater role in determining guidelines in
areas where psychiatrists have previously acted alone. He suggests, for
example, that when initial restraints are used for the purpose of
eventually increasing a patient's intrapsychic freedom, a value
preference is expressed which should reflect a societal judgment. Also,
to the extent that intolerable external behavior becomes the criteria
for invoking coercion, the law should assume the role of defining the
authority of psychiatrists to administer treatment. The author
indicates that use of coercion could serve to prepare the patient to
exercise the right to treatment or to treat the patient over his
conscious objection. In the first instance, without pressure to treat
immediately, the psychiatrist and the patient would have an
opportunity to reach a consensus regarding treatment or to
respectfully differ, and setting time limits would preclude indefinite
postponement of the issue of treatability and would likely contribute
to a lessening of the burden on both parties to treat or be treated when
treatment is neither welcome nor sensible. If treatment is carried out
over the patient's conscious objection, it should be to facilitate a
quick return to the community.
Reflecting other novel, progressive views is the call for increased
participation by the patient in the selection of treatment, perhaps an
all too infrequent practice in medicine where implied consent often
substitutes for informed consent. The importance is apparent where
treatment is state-imposed. A plea is also made for the establishment
of rules to facilitate the therapeutic process, such as transition from
inpatient to outpatient services. In this regard, an outspoken
physician-lawyer has recently called for a concept of a right to
treatment which would embody the requirement of available halfway
houses or other full-time post-hospitalization facilities, claiming that
a lack of such facilities hinders the planning of inpatient care as well
as discharge Katz suggests the duration of treatment should depend
on willingness to continue treatment, rather than upon mental
9. Address by Morton Birnbaum, Association of Medical Superintendents of Mental
Hospitals Annual Meeting, Jan. 15, 1971 (summarized in FRONIERS OF PSYCHIATRY, Jan. 15,
1971 at3, col. 3).
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condition or dangerousness, and that the patient's reaction to
treatment should be stressed in assessing adequacy of treatment.
Katz identifies as a primary task of law and psychiatry the
limitation of the duty to be treated to those who wish to exercise the
right or come to appreciate it. He suggests that for all others
treatment becomes a delusion-an unwarranted denial of

constitutional rights. This position is attractive, particularly where
preventive detention with carefully spelled-out procedural safeguards
is a realistic alternative for certain cases. Psychiatrists would
probably welcome the relief implied from the shifting of emphasis
from "anyone is treatable" to "anyone may be treatable." Likewise,

psychiatric hospitals and the profession generally would appear only
to benefit from pressures which lead to promulgation of standards for
and a philosophy of treatment. Somewhat stronger language than the
author uses might suggest a frequent, silent, unrecognized, and
unwitting conspiracy between psychiatrists and lawyers to obtain a
result, when uncertainties in psychological existence and psychiatric
knowledge as well as unclear legal questions are not squarely accepted
and confronted.
While considerably longer than other essays in the book, Katz'
paper is quite thorough and serves as a good introduction, especially
for mental health personnel, to complex, troublesome issues which
must be encountered. If the past performance of psychiatry does not
glitter in the commentary and exposure by Katz, neither is it unduly
chastised considering the present lack of judicial, legal, and societal
participation which Rouse forecasts. If fault is to be found with the
author's rather forthright discussion of issues, it is in the organization
of his material, which does not encourage cursory review.
In the second chapter, Marschall, 10 looking to the past as well as
the future, constructs a legal setting for the Rouse decision which
effectively complements the other essays. After noting the basic issues
touched upon in Rouse and the possible constitutional underpinning
of the decision absent a statutory right, she gives considerable
attention to the right to treatment as it relates to the reason for
confinement. The author reviews various current practices prior to
concluding that a constitutional right to treatment should exist if
benefit can be derived and that the reason for confinement should
have no bearing on the right. In most jurisdictions dangerousness and
10. Marschall, A Critique of the "'Rightto Treatment" Approach, inMORRIS 37.
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the need for treatment are used as alternate criteria for commitment,
or a standard is employed which mixes the two. Correctly, she asks if
one criterion or the other can be clearly appreciated where treatment
is at issue: Does dangerousness imply a need for treatment? Is a firm
distinction possible at the time of commitment? Although deprivation
of freedom is the same regardless of criteria used, vagueness of criteria
permits a wide latitude of reliance on the judgment of individuals,
particularly psychiatrists and court officials. Whether this latitude is
necessary or desirable is not clear. A California statute is cited which
permits detention to protect the public even if one is not amenable to
treatment, in effect limiting the right to treatment to those who are
treatable."
In considering remedies for lack of adequate treatment, the author
discusses release but repeatedly refers to the practice and rationale of
detention where dangerousness is evident. Possibilities such as
contempt proceedings and transfer of patients are raised, but-a strong
plea for statutory remedies is made. An excellent presentation of the
judicial considerations which might be used in the formulation of a
standard of treatment permits the imaginative reader to make a
comparison with corresponding psychiatric considerations outlined in
the previous chapter.
In the latter part of the essay, the author shifts from a more
informational and documentary style to a reflection upon a variety of
related considerations in right to treatment issues. Going beyond
basic concerns of a right to refuse treatment and society's need to
detain dangerous persons, Marschall cites views suggesting that
hospitalization may be damaging, that medical treatment may be
overvalued in uncertain circumgtances, and that social nonconformity
may often be labeled as mental illness.12 In considering further the
concept of preventive detention, reference to very real difficulties in
predicting dangerousness is respectfully made. Finally, she suggests
that abolition of the insanity defense may be a useful step in
eliminating the confusion between mental illness and criminality
which presently plagues criminal law. In this essay the author explores
in a very readable and informative fashion the major legal concerns
embodied in the Rouse decision.
After introducing his essay by declaring that adequate treatment
should be a right guaranteed to all who come to a mental hospital,
11. CAL. WVELF. & INST'NS CODE § 6300 et seq. (West Supp. 1970).
12. Marschall, A Critiqueof the "Right to Treatment" Approach, in

MORRIS

55-57.
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Visotsky 3 traces the history of institutional psychiatric treatment in
this country as a saga of fluctuating emphasis between healing and
custody, culminating more recently in the largely inadequate "aide
culture." In the latter setting, safety, protection, and institutional
adjustment are more valued than treatment: programs are designed
for benefit of the aide; patients perform at the level expected and do
what is expected for release; and administrators frequently substitute
ease for responsibility. Such a development is perhaps not unlike
occurrences in our penal institutions, which are naively viewed as
"correctional."
Around a number of rather insightful observations, the author
constructs what might be regarded as an ideal rather than adequate
treatment standard, ignoring many of the realities-emphasized
elsewhere in the book-surrounding the Rouse decision. He suggests
that adequacy might be gauged by the operational measure of
effectiveness of treatment in view of the goal of returning the patient
to the community and into functional roles-independence and
employability. The regressive nature of any illness necessarily restricts
the freedom of the patient and accordingly must be considered in any
system charged with treatment. Ideally, size of hospital, quality of
staff-patient contact, community mental health services, integration
of public and private sectors in mental health activities, new funding
sources, and education of the public would be among important
factors in setting up treatment programs. The author suggests that
involuntary commitments should require more than the mere presence
of mental illness, for example, proof of potential violence, protesting
that these procedures have too long permitted "dumping grounds"
for obscure reasons. Finally, he cites a "Bill of Rights for the
Mentally Ill" which embraces many of the reforms advocated.)
The call to excellence and the perspective of Visotsky undoubtedly
add depth to any examination of treatment practices and potentials in
psychiatry. The extensive scope of his comments may be more
relevant to the ultimate refinement of concepts first legitimatized in
Rouse than contributory to the more elementary and practical
considerations now commanded. This essay does serve as a transition
between the disciplined approaches of Katz and Marschall, and the
13. Visotsky, Adequacy of Treatment and Provisionsfor Methods ofAssuring Adequacy oJ
Treatment,in MORRIs 63.
14. Id. at 74-75.
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more expansive, anticipatory, and even visionary commentaries which
follow them.
Hollingshead's 5 description of his efforts to inauguarate a reliable
system of gathering data of epidemiologicallg significance offers an
interesting, informative, and readable account; however, one struggles
to find the degree of relevance to the stated purposes of the book as
shown by other contributors.
Certainly, the conflict between the advancement of science and the
privacy of individuals is a timely concern in the law, and Hollingshead
has made extremely valuable contributions in this area. As
government interest in mental health continues to increase, the need
for the kind of information obtained in individual biographical
studies and the myriad problems encountered in gathering it will
become increasingly crucial concerns. However, the problems posed
in the right to treatment in Rouse appear largely of a different quality
and are more directly addressed in other chapters of the published
symposium.
As author of the Rouse opinion, Judge Bazelon, 17 might have
restricted his comments to any one of several innovative aspects of the
case. Fortunately for the overall value of the book, he identifies the
primary controversy over Rouse as the questioned competence of the
courts to protect the right to treatment, and addresses the bulk of his
comments to this issue. Only secondarily does he treat his claim that
the rationale for the right is clear.
In taking to task those in the law who "accept the accustomed and
fear the new," Judge Bazelon assails "diffidence in the face of
scientific expertise" and offers judicial review of administrative
decisions as the model to counter criticism of Rouse. In this instance,
the reviewing court, rather than substituting its own uninformed
judgment from a study of the record, insures that an administrator
performs with care and reaches a reasonable result. Only the scope of
the review varies. He correctly notes that psychiatrists, as do other
experts, disagree, a reality with which the courts are familiar. Highly
preferable, he indicates, would be legislative commitment to the
15. Hollingshead, Mental Illness: The Rights of the Individualversus Community Needs, in
MORRIS 78.

16. "The epidemiologist tries to determine who develops a disease, when, and under what
conditions. He is as interested in members of a population who are 'well' as those who are
'sick.'" Id. at 81.
17. Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, in MORRIS 95.
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establishment of guidelines and machinery which would insure a right
to treatment. Such guidelines might be patterned after those of the
Social Security Administration 8 or forged from legislative, agency,
and judicial interaction. Without such guidelines, hospital
administrators must both provide treatment and review its adequacy.
Advantages as well as disadvantages inherent in this approach are
obvious.
Judge Bazelon takes the position that the courts should expose the
inadequacy where it exists and provide the community, particularly
the i sychiatric profession and the legislature, with a chance to
respond. Judicial review of administrative processes would
nevertheless remain available to the courts. The position is also taken
that preventive detention, if practiced, demands due process standards
as high as those of the criminal law. Judge Bazelon views the likely
turmoil of enforcing a right to treatment as intermediate to a reexamination of other practices relating to mental illness, especially
those surrounding involuntary hospitalization. Also cited are the
problems involving adequacy of psychiatric testimony and quality of
legal representation in his experience in administration of the Durham
rule. 19

A spirited optimism pervades the words of Judge Bazelon as he
challenges lawyers, psychiatrists, judges, legislators, and indeed the
entire community to insure the viability of Rouse. Beyond this, a
prophetic, crusading tone reaches zenith in his declaration that "we
owe [mental health] to every man."2' Without doubt, Bazelon has
championed the cause of the mentally ill in law and in psychiatry but
risks unnecessary alarm and resistance where the realities of problems
surrounding Rouse are not fully respected.
In the concluding essay21 the editor of the book brings his
publication to a somewhat disappointing close. Few would strongly
disagree with his statements which suggest that applying the criminal
label to individuals should not exclude them from treatment. The
"mentally ill criminals" 2 and "mentally ill noncriminal criminals"' 3
18. 20 C.F.R. §§ 405.1036-38 (1970).

19. "[Ain accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental
disease or mental defect." Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874-75 (D.C. Cir. 1954).

20. Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, in MORRIS 108.
21. Morris, "Criminality" andthe Right to Treatment, in MORRIS 109.

22. A convicted criminal who becomes mentally ill subsequent to imprisonment. Id. at 113.
23. A criminal defendant either determined too incompetent to stand trial or found innocent
by reason of insanity. Id. at 113-14.
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as a class are no more dangerous than ordinary mental patients;
proper treatment for mental illness depends on diagnosis and
pathology, not criminal status, and dangerousness is not dependent on
when the illness developed. On the other hand, there seems to be an
overemphasis on criminality in view of the right to treatment
orientation of the book. It is not always clear who the author is
holding responsible for unequal treatment of criminals who are
mentally ill and "noncriminal criminals" who are mentally ill. A
position that all criminals are mentally ill would be open to serious
challenge, and other authors have stressed that procedural safeguards
are often available to those deprived of freedom via criminal
conviction in contrast to those deprived of freedom through civil
commitment for mental illness. The lesson of "Operation
Baxstrom,"' suggesting a rather effectime pathway of administrative
remedy insofar as equal treatment of the mentally ill in these groups is
concerned, speaks for itself. Little attention is given to what may be a
more basic issue-current sentencing philosophies and purposes of
criminal sanctions. The overemphasis of some rather self-evident
statements, as well as a somewhat naive treatment of other
observations, do not appear in keeping with the announced intent of
the book.
A service for the many students of Rouse has obviously been
performed in bringing together the focused commentaries of several
distinguished authors in this book. Considering the minimal editing
claimed- the lack of repetition is all the more remarkable. The book is
compact, and the essays for the most part are comprehensible and
well documented. Such discordance that exists suggests disparity in
approach to and emphasis upon proposed solutions rather than a
failure to recognize certain problems.
The public advocacy of the right to treatment began over a decade
ago.21 Those individuals "out of sight, out of mind" 2 have awaited a
champion. A very recent study offers evidence that for at least a
decade the public has accepted mental illness as illness, looks to the
medical profession for treatment of this illness, and is optimistic
24. Derived from the decision in Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966), requiring
mentally ill criminals be treated as ordinary mental patients at the expiration of their prison
sentences. See Hunt & Wiley, Operation Baxstrom After One Year, 124 Abi. J. PSYCHIATRY
974 (1968).
25. Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment. 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960).
26. THE RIGHT TO TREATMENT: A SYwsPosluM 8 (D. Burrs, ed. 1969).
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about the outcome of such treatment.Yz It concludes that mental
health professionals must move away from assumptions based on
studies of two decades ago. The future development of ideas expressed
in Rouse is uncertain, but there seems to be little doubt that both law
and psychiatry have benefited appreciabily from the discussion
surrounding the case, and are likely to continue to do so.
Johnnie L. Gallemore, Jr., M.D.*
27. Crocetti, Are the Ranks Closed? Attitudinal Social Distance and Mental Illness, 127
Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 1121 (1971).
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